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UNJUST TIMING LIMITATIONS IN GENETIC MALPRACTICE
CASES†
Gary Marchant*
Bonnie LeRoy**
Lauren Clatch***
Ellen Wright Clayton****
As genomic data are increasingly being collected and applied in
clinical care, physicians, laboratories, and other health care
providers are more frequently being sued for alleged medical
malpractice or negligence.1 Because the genetic underpinnings of an
existing or future health condition may not be immediately apparent,
such cases sometimes raise unique timing issues involving the
applicable statute of limitations, statute of repose, or statutory
notification requirements.2 Although these timing limitations on
when a lawsuit can be brought have important policy rationales and
justifications, such as helping to protect providers from open-ended
liability,3 their application to genetic liability cases may sometimes
result in fundamental unfairness and unjust results because of the
unavoidable delayed discovery of the potential negligence in
detecting or addressing the genetic contribution of a patient’s
condition.4
† Preparation of this Article was funded by National Human Genome Research Institute
(NHGRI) and National Cancer Institute (NCI) grant #1R01HG008605 (Wolf, Clayton, Lawrenz,
PIs), as part of a project on “LawSeqSM: Building a Sound Legal Foundation for Translating
Genomics into Clinical Application.” The views expressed in this Article are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the funders.
* Gary Marchant, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., is Regents’ Professor of Law and Faculty Director of
the Center for Law, Science and Innovation at Arizona State University.
** Bonnie LeRoy, M.S., L.G.C., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Program in Genetic
Counseling at the University of Minnesota.
*** Lauren Clatch is a candidate for a joint degree in law (J.D.) and social psychology (Ph.D.)
at the University of Minnesota.
**** Ellen W. Clayton, M.D., J.D., is Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics, and Professor of Law
at Vanderbilt University Medical Center and Vanderbilt University.
1 Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, Genomic Malpractice: An Emerging Tide or Gentle
Ripple?, 73 FOOD DRUG L.J. 1, 2 (2018).
2 Id. at 26.
3 See infra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
4 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26; infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
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The timing dilemmas presented in genetic malpractice cases are
illustrated by a closely-watched pending case in South Carolina––
Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.5 In that case, a test laboratory
failed to recognize the clinical significance of a mutation carried by a
child, classifying it as a variant of unknown significance.6 As a result,
the child was not given the appropriate treatment and tragically
passed away.7 The substantive issue in the case is when the
laboratory should have recognized the pathogenic nature of the
mutation and communicated that information to the child’s treating
physician.8 However, the case may be decided on a procedural timing
issue, depending in part on whether the lawsuit against the
laboratory is considered a medical malpractice case or a general
negligence case.9 The South Carolina District Court certified a
question to the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether
“a federally licensed genetic testing laboratory” is considered a
“licensed health care provider” under South Carolina law, and the
South Carolina Supreme Court answered affirmatively, meaning
that the six-year statute of repose for medical malpractice may
apply.10
The defendants have now moved to dismiss the case since the case
was brought more than eight years after the laboratory’s allegedly
negligent act.11 However, the plaintiff’s mother did not discover, and
had no reasonable means to discover, until long after the statute of
repose had run that the laboratory allegedly should have known of
the pathogenic nature of the child’s mutation at the time of testing.12
Although this case is still pending as of the time of this writing, if the
court were to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim as untimely, such an
outcome would be an example of a manifestly unjust result in a
genetic malpractice case in which a family had no possible way to
determine the nature of the genetic condition and the alleged
malpractice until well after the time for filing a lawsuit had expired.

5 Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 440, 443 (D. S.C. 2018); see Turna
Ray, Mother’s Negligence Suit Against Quest’s Athena Could Broadly Impact Genetic Testing
Labs, GENOMEWEB (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.genomeweb.com/molecular-diagnostics
/mothers-negligence-suit-against-quests-athena-could-broadly-impact-genetic [https://perma
.cc/3TVH-Y539].
6 Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 436–37.
7 Id. at 437.
8 See id. at 437, 441, 443, 445.
9 See id. at 438, 440, 443.
10 Id. at 436, 440; Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 816 S.E.2d 564, 564, 566 (S.C. 2018).
11 Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 436, 443.
12 Id. at 444–45.
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While similar problems occasionally pop up in other types of
medical malpractice cases,13 they are likely to be much more common
in genetic malpractice cases because the provider error often remains
hidden for years or even decades.14 This then creates a growing
tension between the injured plaintiff’s right to seek legal recourse in
a case, where they have allegedly been injured, against the providers’
interest in preventing open-ended liability and the litigation of old
cases where the evidence may be stale. This Article addresses this
tension and the potential unfairness that may result in genetic
malpractice cases due to statutory timing constraints. In Part I, we
provide background on the types, purposes, requirements, and
prevalence of such timing limitations. In Part II, we provide some
additional examples of unfair and unjust outcomes in genetic
malpractice cases from applying such timing limits. Finally, in
Part III, we offer some potential solutions that recognizes the
legitimate need of health care providers to not face open-ended
liability while also protecting injured patients from being blocked
from seeking a legal remedy when they could not have possibly
discovered their potential legal claim before the applicable timing
limitation had expired. This problem raises the broader issue of what
should lawmakers do when a legal regime that was created for an
earlier era and different technology is now challenged by new
technology that may not fit or align well with that historical legal
regime.
I. BACKGROUND ON LITIGATING TIMING LIMITATIONS
In torts and other types of litigation, certain state statutes limit
the time within which a plaintiff can bring a claim, which are
generically called statutory limitations (SLs).15 These statutory
limitations can be in two main categories: statutes of limitation
(SoLs) and statutes of repose (SoRs).16 As elaborated below, SoLs
generally run from the time that the plaintiff did or should have
discovered that they had a cause of action, whereas SoRs are more
harsh, and run from the time that the tortious act occurred,
regardless of whether or when the plaintiff discovered the tortious
nature of the act.17 A third type of timing limitation in tort lawsuits

13
14
15
16
17

See, e.g., Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 407, 409, 411 (8th Cir. 1982).
See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 10, 26.
See Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 819–20 (Okla. 1988).
Id.
See id. For further elaboration on the SoL and SoR, see infra notes 27–37 and
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are statutes that require a plaintiff to provide timely notification of
their intent to sue, which often apply only to defendants that are
public institutions.18
These SLs impose bright-line rules to bar claims brought after the
times specified.19 Courts emphasize that the purpose of such SLs
involves justice and process concerns, including that evidence
deteriorates over time, defendants are entitled to peace of mind at
some point, insurers and defendants need a degree of certainty in
order to estimate future costs, and societal expectations and
standards change over time.20 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court
stated back in 1944 that statutory limitation periods are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through
the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared. The theory is that even if one has a just
claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend
within the period of limitation and that the right to be free of
stale claims in time comes to prevail over the right to
prosecute them.21
In the genetic context, these practical arguments for timing
limitations will have particular salience. There is a strong argument
that providers need to be protected from open-ended liability, as gene
sequencing and testing will generate many “variants of unknown
significance” at the time of the testing, but which may have clinical
significance later on.22 Given the well-known hindsight bias of jurors
and the liability system,23 there will be a tendency and temptation to

accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-401
(LexisNexis 2019).
19 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 241, at 871 (2d ed. 2011).
20 Id. § 241, at 872; see also Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d
283, 287 (Tex. 2010) (“One practical upside of curbing open-ended exposure is to prevent
defendants from answering claims where evidence may prove elusive due to unavailable
witnesses (perhaps deceased), faded memories, lost or destroyed records, and institutions that
no longer exist.”).
21 Order of R.R. Tels. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
22 See Adrian Thorogood et al., Public Variant Databases: Liability?, 19 GENETICS MED. 838,
839 (2017).
23 See e.g., Hal R. Arkes, The Consequences of the Hindsight Bias in Medical Decision
Making, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 356, 356 (2013); Matt Groeb, Does Bifurcation
Eliminate the Problem: A Closer Look at Hindsight Bias in the Courtroom, 23 JURY EXPERT 17,
17–18 (2011); Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 9–10; Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias
and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1281–82 (1999).

0061 MARCHANT ET AL, UNJUST GENETIC MALPRACTICE TIMING LIMITATIONS

2019/2020]

Unjust Genetic Malpractice Timing Limitations

1/17/2020 2:55 PM

65

second-guess the provider’s initial judgment and attribute greater
knowledge than is fair retrospectively the longer the window of
liability remains open.24
On the other hand, as discussed further below, the unique timing
issues and nature of genetic malpractice cases may result in some
plaintiffs not discovering the negligence that harmed them until after
the timing statute has expired.25 Thus, although the purpose and
meaning of SLs may seem simple on first impression, their
application raises many complex and difficult issues in balancing the
interests of the parties. Judge Richard Posner cautioned, “Though
rarely the subject of sustained scholarly attention, the law concerning
statutes of limitations fairly bristles with subtle, intricate, often
misunderstood issues.”26
Typically, in negligence claims,27 the statutory clock does not start
until the defendant commits a negligent act and that act caused
legally cognizable harm.28 Many states have added a third triggering
requirement, which is when the plaintiff reasonably should have
discovered the negligent act.29 This two- or three-prong requirement
is typical for statutes of limitation.30 Statutes of repose, on the other
hand, provide an alternative to the two- or three-prong requirement
of statutes of limitations and require only that a negligent act
occurred to trigger the statutory clock.31 Although almost all legal
actions have an SoL (extreme criminal charges such as murder being
an exception), SoRs are imposed by state legislatures much more
selectively.32 In addition, unlike an SoL, an SoR generally cannot be

See Arkes, supra note 23, at 358.
See infra notes 160–169 and accompanying text.
26 Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996).
27 Negligence claims are a subset of tort claims where a defendant allegedly fails to exercise
reasonable care. See B. Sonny Bal, An Introduction to Medical Malpractice in the United States,
467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS RELATED RES. 339, 340 (Nov. 26, 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih
.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628513/pdf/11999_2008_Article_636.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TAT9AU63]. Most medical malpractice lawsuits involve a negligence claim. See, e.g., id. at 342.
28 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 242, at 876. These two requirements do not apply to all
torts. Id.
29 Id. § 243, at 878 & n.6.
30 Id. § 243, at 878–79.
31 Id. § 244, at 884. The act of diagnosing and communicating the diagnosis to the patient
is considered the legally cognizable “act,” not the means of coming to the diagnosis by viewing
records or lab tests, which might occur on a different day than the communication with the
patient. See, e.g., Green v. Nat’l Health Lab., 870 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Ark. 1994).
32 See Cara O’Neill, Civil Statutes of Limitations, NOLO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.nolo.com
/legal-encyclopedia/statute-of-limitations-state-laws-chart-29941.html
[https://perma.cc
/VG3A-PH82]; Criminal Statutes of Limitations: Time Limits for State Charges, LAWINFO,
https://resources.lawinfo.com/criminal-defense/criminal-statute-limitations-time-limits.html
[https://perma.cc/B2LN-7PU6]; see, e.g., New York Legislature Considers Enacting Statute of
24
25
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tolled.33 A Tennessee court succinctly explained the difference
between an SoL and SoR as follows:
A statute of limitations governs the time within which suit
may be brought once a cause of action accrued. A statute of
repose limits the time within which an action may be brought,
“but it is entirely unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action
and can, in fact, bar a cause of action before it has accrued.”34
In order to understand the differential purposes of SoLs and SoRs,
it is helpful to consider the history of SoRs, the more recent of the two
SLs. SoRs were mostly enacted as part of the tort reform legislation
in the 1970s and 80s and were created to protect certain groups such
as product manufacturers, government entities, architects and
builders, and health care professionals from long liability “tails” that
were seen as excessive.35 The SoRs were intended “to eliminate
uncertainties under the related statute of limitations and to create a
final deadline for filing suit that is not subject to any exceptions.”36
SoRs pertaining to health care providers’ typically begin to run at the
moment of “the doctor’s last act or the completion of treatment,” even
if the harm from that last act does not become evident until later.37
Because health care providers are subject to primarily negligence
and medical malpractice claims, SLs in negligence and medical
malpractice statutes are relevant here. Medical malpractice claims
are a subset of negligence claims, but courts do not have standardized
rules across jurisdictions for determining whether a case with a
Repose Legislation, GOLDBERG SEGALA (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.goldbergsegalla.com/newsand-knowledge/news/new-york-legislature-considers-enacting-statute-of-repose-legislation
[https://perma.cc/ZK4T-BKDL].
33 CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014) (quoting Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572
U.S. 1, 10 (2014)).
34 Jones v. Methodist Healthcare, 83 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (quoting Cronin
v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995)) (citing Cheswold Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lambertson
Constr. Co., 489 A.2d 413, 421 (Del. 1985)).
35 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 885; see, e.g., Branch v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr.,
636 So. 2d 211, 212–217 (La. 1994) (discussing a medical malpractice tort reform statute). To
date, the greatest number of SoRs involve construction and products liability. See Aaron
Larson, What Is a Statute of Repose, EXPERTLAW (May 8, 2018), https://www.expertlaw.com
/library/civil-litigation/what-statue-of-repose [https://perma.cc/K7PT-EWA6].
The groups
protected by SORs starting in the 1970s and 80s lobbied for the statutes that instituted shorter
statutory clocks vis-à-vis 1-prong “act” triggers. See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at
885.
36 Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex. 2010).
37 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 885; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-482(a) (2019); FLA.
STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (2019); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5838a(2) (2019); MO. REV STAT. § 516.105
(2018).
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health care professional defendant is one of typical negligence or
medical malpractice;38 and this impacts SL determinations because
negligence and medical malpractice SLs can be different within the
same jurisdiction.39
For example, Minnesota has a medical
malpractice SoL of four years40 and a negligence SoL of six years.41
Additionally, SoRs apply much more selectively, and in many states
will apply to a medical malpractice action but not a general
negligence claim.42
If the SL is written to require an alleged wrongful act and some
knowledge of the defendant’s alleged contribution to the harm (in
other words, written as an SoL), then the court has to determine
based on statutory language and case law precedent if the triggering
event is the manifestation of an injury or the discovery of the
defendant’s role in causing the injury.43 If, on the other hand, the
statute is written to require only an alleged act, as is the case of an
SoR, this distinction is moot. Specifically, SoRs are upheld even
when the injury becomes perceptible after the SoR time has run,44
whereas SoL decisions often revolve around determination of when
the injury occurred45 and/or when the plaintiff knew or with
reasonable diligence should have known of the injury, its cause, and
the defendant’s possible error.46 Figure 1 provides a conceptual
timeline depicting a hypothetical medical practitioner’s act, a
cognizable injury, and patient’s discovery with arrows indicating
what is conceptually categorized as an SoR or SoL. As will be seen in
later case examples, the SoR often does not extend to the patient’s
discovery of the tort, especially in cases like genomic malpractice,
where the tort and injury may not be immediately apparent.47

38 See, e.g., Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 432, 440, 441–42 (D. S.C.
2018) (citing Dawkins v. Union Hosp. Dist., 758 S.E.2d 501, 504–05 (S.C. 2014)); Scott v.
Uljanov, 541 N.E.2d 398, 398–99 (N.Y. 1989) (quoting Bleiler v. Bodnar, 479 N.E.2d 230, 234
(N.Y. 1985)).
39 See Scott, 541 N.E.2d at 399.
40 MINN. STAT. § 541.076(b) (2019).
41 Id. § 541.05 subdiv. 1(5).
42 See, e.g., Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. D. M., 779 S.E.2d 36, 39 (Ga. Ct. App.2015).
43 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 244, at 878-84.
44 See, e.g., Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 950–52 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that an eighteen-year statute of repose of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 bars
products liability claims by survivors of passengers killed in airplane crash).
45 See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553, 555 (2000).
46 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 250 (2019).
47 See infra Part II.
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model of SoR and SoL

The following sections describe cases involving defendant health
care professionals and plaintiffs who suffered a harm but whose
genetic malpractice claims were barred by various SLs, explaining
how genetic conditions pose a particularly acute problem to
traditional medical malpractice SLs.
II. EXAMPLES OF UNJUST OUTCOMES IN GENOMIC MALPRACTICE
CASES
Genetic conditions will often present SoL and SoR issues because
the discovery of the genetic risk may not occur until several years
after a physician commits the allegedly negligent act, by which time
the traditional SoL, SoR, or statutory notification requirement may
have run. A recent analysis of over 200 genetic malpractice cases
found that “the mean time between filing of a case and the final
decision was 6.75 years,”48 whereas other medical malpractice cases
take a mean of just over 3.5 years from conduct to resolution.49 Thus,
genetic malpractice cases take, on average, almost twice as long to
resolve as other medical malpractice cases. Presumably, the actual
litigation of a genetic malpractice case does not take significantly
longer than any other malpractice case, it is just that genetic
malpractice cases are discovered and filed later after the time of
medical error than in other medical malpractice cases.50 This is
because the negligent act regarding a genetic test is often not
immediately manifest but may remain latent for years or even

Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 15.
See Seth A. Seabury et al., On Average, Physicians Spend Nearly 11 Percent of Their 40Year Careers with an Open, Unresolved Malpractice Claim, 32 HEALTH AFF. 111, 113 (2013).
50 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26.
48
49
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decades before being discovered.51 Thus, the traditional application
of litigation timing requirements in a medical malpractice case
involving genetics could result in manifestly unjust results.
SoRs result in particularly harsh results.52 For example, consider
a case decided by the Florida Supreme Court.53 In this case, a family
had their first child who was affected by multiple disabilities, and the
parents then were tested for genetic abnormalities that might affect
future children.54 Even though the child did have a genetic
abnormality (trisomy of part of chromosome 10), as revealed by
chromosomal testing, that result was never communicated to the
family.55 The failure of the physician to communicate the genetic
testing results to the family was the allegedly negligent act. 56
However, the harm caused by that negligent act did not arise until
five years later when the couple had a second child with the same
genetic condition, and the physician’s error in failing to communicate
the genetic results five years earlier was discovered.57 It is important
to note that, although the negligent act occurred five years later, the
tort was not completed, and no lawsuit could have been filed, until
the second child was born, as the harm caused by the negligence was
the birth of the second affected child (damages are an essential
precondition for filing a tort claim).58 Although the parents filed their
lawsuit two years after their second child was born, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the lawsuit was barred by Florida’s fouryear statute of repose for medical malpractice actions.59 In other
words, the statute of repose had run before the tort was even
complete.60 The parents’ right to sue had expired before a lawsuit
could possibly have been filed, which is arguably a manifestly unjust
outcome.
Another statute of repose case involved alleged negligence in
failing to diagnose Long QT syndrome, a genetic condition that
increases the risk of sudden death.61 The physician defendant
See id. at 26–27.
See Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 421–22 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam) (citing Melendez v.
Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So. 2d 735, 735–36 (Fla. 1987)).
53 Kush, 616 So. 2d 415.
54 See id. at 417.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 See 3 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 479, at 2.
59 See Kush, 616 So. 2d at 417, 421–22, 424 (citing Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 515
So. 2d 735, 735–36 (Fla. 1987)).
60 See id. at 421.
61 Burton v. Macha, 846 N.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Mich. Ct. App. 2014).
51
52
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admitted Connor Burton into the hospital on June 21, 2005, for a
tonsillectomy and adenoidectomy.62 An EKG readout at the hospital
reported “prolonged QT”, and although the defendant reviewed and
initialed the EKG report, he took no other action on this
information.63 Almost four years later, on April 17, 2009, Connor
passed away suddenly, and his autopsy failed to detect any signs of
injury or illness.64 A few months later, on September 11, 2009,
genetic testing revealed a mutation “strongly associated with an
arrhythmia-causing syndrome, such as Type 3 Long QT Syndrome.”65
A month later, on October 13, 2009, Connor’s death certificate was
amended to reflect “[s]udden cardiac death due to or as a consequence
of Prolonged QT Syndrome due to or as a consequence of Mutation
SCN5A Thr 370 Type 3 Met (of years duration).”66 Connor’s family
brought a medical malpractice lawsuit on October 13, 2011, alleging
that the defendants were negligent in “failing to diagnose Connor
with prolonged QT syndrome and failing to refer him for appropriate
treatment.”67 The Court of Appeals of Michigan held that although
the three-year statute of limitations did not start to run until the
death certificate was amended based on the genetic testing in the fall
of 2009, the six-year statute of repose started to run on the date of
the negligent act (June 21, 2005), and therefore the lawsuit was
precluded by the statute of repose.68
This case has a harsh outcome, although it is not as egregious as
the previous one because the harm (Connor’s sudden death) occurred
before the statute of repose had completely run.69 Yet, by the time
the death certificate was revised, giving the family the first clue that
a potentially negligent act had contributed to Connor’s death, the
family was left with only about twenty months to discover the
negligence and file a lawsuit before the statute of repose had run.70
Additionally, even though the lawsuit was filed well within the threeyear statute of limitations, a claim just needs to exceed one of the
applicable SLs to be dismissed.71

62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

See id. at 420.
See id. at 420–21.
See id. at 420.
Id.
Id. at 420–21.
Id. at 421.
See id. at 420–23.
See id. at 420–21, 423.
See id. at 420–23.
See id. at 421–22.
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In another genetic SoR case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in
2017 upheld a trial court’s finding for the defendant medical
practitioner, awarding judgment based on an expired SoR.72 In this
case, a son donated a lobe of his liver to his mother, who was
diagnosed with a genetic disorder, Alpha-1 Antitrypsin Deficiency
(AATD), after testing in the same year as the donation purportedly
demonstrated that the son did not have AATD.73 Eleven years later,
in 2014, when his mother was experiencing more liver issues, the
family discovered the son’s positive AATD test result from 2003.74 A
lawsuit was filed in 2015.75 The SoR at issue in this case detailed a
general rule for the SoR and an exception:
§ 1303.513. Statute of repose
(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c),
no cause of action asserting a medical professional liability
claim may be commenced after seven years from the date of
the alleged tort or breach of contract.
(b) Injuries caused by foreign object.--If the injury is or was
caused by a foreign object unintentionally left in the
individual’s body, the limitation in subsection (a) shall not
apply.76
However, the state supreme court’s previous precedent explained
that “the injury need not have occurred, much less have been
discovered.”77 Thus, because judicial gloss did not leave room to
argue that “alleged tort” must include a cognizable, known injury,
patients argued that (1) the SoR violated equal protection and due
process in the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, and (2) the SoR
violated the open courts provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution.78
The state appellate court disagreed with the arguments, reasoning
that (1) there is no fundamental human interest at stake in obtaining
damages in civil claims and the foreign object exception is different
72 See Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 1331 WDA 2016, 2017 WL 3168991, at *7 (Pa. Super. Ct. July
26, 2017) (citing Swift v. Milner, 538 A.2d 28, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Booher v. Olczak, 797
A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)), cert. granted in part, denied in part, 183 A.3d 346 (Pa.
2018) (per curiam), and rev’d, No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019).
73 See Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *1.
74 See id.
75 Id. at *2.
76 Id. at *3; accord 40 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1303.513 (2019), invalidated by Yanakos v. UPMC
No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019).
77 Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *3 (quoting Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198,
211 (Pa. 2009)).
78 Yanakos, 2017 WL 3168991, at *2.
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from the instant case because durability of evidence is not as strong
as having evidence of wrongdoing nestled in one’s body and (2) state
Supreme Court precedent rejects the open courts argument to SoRs.79
On March 28, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted
certiorari in this case to hear the specific question: “Does the [Medical
Care Availability and Reduction of Error Act] MCARE Statute of
Repose violate the Open Courts guarantees of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, Article I, § 11, where it arbitrarily and capriciously
deprives some patients of any access to courts, but permits actions by
similarly situated patients?”80 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
answered this question affirmatively on October 31, 2019, and struck
down the MCARE statute of repose,81 an outcome that will likely have
an important impact on the role of SoRs in denying plaintiffs a viable
litigation option in similar SoR cases.
SoLs can also produce harsh results in genetic malpractice cases,
especially in states with very short statutes of limitation for medical
malpractice actions.82 An example is provided by a case in which a
pregnant mother knew she was a carrier for the sickle cell trait and
had the father of her fetus genetically tested in order to prevent
conceiving a child with sickle cell disease.83 On January 16, 1985,
the hospital misread the test results and incorrectly reported that
father was not a carrier, and the mother gave birth to a child on
August 30, 1985.84 The child was diagnosed with sickle cell disease,
and the mother brought suit against the hospital.85 She was first
required to provide notice to the hospital, which she did on November
27, 1985, and then filed a lawsuit on September 11, 1986.86 A lower
court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by the
“continuous treatment doctrine,” under which the statute of
limitations does not start to run until the end of the patient’s
treatment, which the lower court determined to be the date of the
child’s birth.87 The lawsuit was brought within eighteen months of
79 See id. at *5–7 (first quoting Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001);
and then quoting Krason v. Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 52 (3d Cir. 1985)) (citing
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 382 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1978)).
80 Yanakos v. UPMC, 183 A.3d 346, 346–47 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam).
81 Yanakos, 2019 WL 5608534, at *1.
82 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26–29.
83 Jorge v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 590 N.E.2d 239, 239 (N.Y. 1992).
84 Id. at 239–40.
85 Id. at 240.
86 Jorge v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 563 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412 (App. Div. 1991), rev’d, 590
N.E.2d 239 (N.Y. 1992).
87 See Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 577 N.E.2d 1026, 1027
(N.Y. 1991)); Jorge, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
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the child’s birth, when the mother first had the opportunity to
discover the hospital’s negligence, and therefore the lower court held
that the suit was brought within the applicable SoL.88 The New York
Court of Appeals, in contrast, held that the statute of limitations
started to run on the date that the father’s erroneous genetic results
were reported since that genetic test “was simply not committed in
relation to the ongoing obstetric care that plaintiff received.”89 Thus,
the eighteen-month statute of limitations ran throughout the
remainder of the pregnancy, during which the mother had no way of
knowing the hospital had made its mistake. Consequently, by the
time the negligence was discovered and the lawsuit was filed, the
eighteen-month statute of limitations had run, and the lawsuit was
dismissed as time-barred.90
Another type of timing limitation is a requirement to provide
advance notice of a pending lawsuit against a public entity, such as a
city or a public university hospital.91
This type of timing
requirement, which is typically very short, can also produce unjust
results in a genetic malpractice case.92 In one such example involving
a statutory notice requirement, a five-year-old girl died while being
treated by a doctor employed by a public university clinic, and an
autopsy and further research indicated that the patient had an
undisclosed genetic heart condition.93 Once the genetic risk factor
was discovered after the girl’s death, the mother promptly brought a
lawsuit alleging the doctor was negligent in not diagnosing the girl’s
genetic heart ailment.94 The case was dismissed because the plaintiff
failed to comply with the notice requirement for a public entity, which
requires that a medical malpractice plaintiff provide notice of the
claim within ninety days of the negligent act.95 In this case, the
mother had no way to discover the negligent act until over ninety
days after the negligent act occurred, but the court dismissed the
claim nonetheless, even while acknowledging that the genetic nature
of disease was not known during the ninety day notice period.96

See Jorge, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 412–14.
Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck, 577 N.E.2d at 1027).
90 Jorge, 590 N.E.2d at 240 (citing Nykorchuck, 577 N.E.2d at 1027).
91 See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 29.
92 See id.
93 See Hood v. Ramagopal, No. A-1480-13T4, 2015 WL 5008979, at *1–2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. Aug. 18, 2015).
94 See id.
95 See id. at *4, *6.
96 See id. at *2, *6.
88
89
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III. SOLUTIONS
The specific examples presented in the previous section portend a
much greater forward-looking problem for the medical malpractice
system. As genetics becomes an increasingly important part of
clinical medicine,97 and consequently as more cases of genomic
malpractice are brought to the courts,98 the problem of unjust
application of SLs in such cases will surely proliferate. This is due to
both the increased frequency of such cases,99 and the inherent nature
of genetic malpractice cases where a provider’s error may remain
“silent” and undetectable for years or even decades.100 These genomic
malpractice cases typically involve the failure to accurately obtain
and apply information about future health risks, and so the harm and
indication of error usually does not become apparent until those
future genetic-related risks manifest.101 By that time, under current
legal doctrine, the SoL or SoR may well have expired.
How can legal systems respond when legal doctrine established to
control technology in one era now become obsolete or result in unjust
outcomes when applied to new technologies not anticipated when the
original doctrine was established? One option would be to just accept
some unjust applications––the world is not perfect, and if the legal
doctrine is serving a useful purpose in most contexts (which is the
case with SLs), then maybe some unjust applications are
inevitable.102 This strategy of complacency and non-action is
becoming increasingly untenable in the era of clinical genomics, when
more and more unjust results like the ones described in the previous
section are expected occur.
A second strategy would be to throw out the old rules altogether
and go without rules in that subject area.103 SLs do serve important
functions in protecting providers and the court system from stale
cases and open-ended liability,104 so eliminating SLs altogether is
also an untenable solution. A third strategy would be to adopt sui
generis SL rules just for genomic malpractice cases.105
But
See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 1–2.
See id. at 16.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 15, 18–19, 26.
102 See Methodist Healthcare Sys. of San Antonio v. Rankin, 307 S.W.3d 283, 292 (Tex. 2010)
(citing S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 23 (Tex. 1996)).
103 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875.
104 See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
105 Lyria Bennet Moses, Sui Generis Rules, in 7 THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 77–78, 81 (Gary E.
97
98
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technology-specific sui generis rules have many problems, including
definitional issues, unfairness, and over-inclusivity and underinclusivity.106 Moreover, since SLs are adopted on a state-by-state
basis by state legislatures,107 it would be impractical to expect new
laws to be adopted specifically for genetic malpractice cases in every
state any time in the foreseeable future.
Since doing nothing, eliminating the existing SL rules, or adopting
sui generis SLs for genomic malpractice are all untenable or
infeasible, the remaining option would be to try to modify the
application of SLs to avoid the harsh and unjust impacts in genomic
malpractice cases.108 There is a long history of courts, and to a lesser
extent legislatures, modifying the application of SLs in other contexts
where they were producing unfair or unjust outcomes.109
Historically, courts have interpreted state timing statutes to instill a
degree of flexibility by making findings of law that control (1) the
starting time for the statutory clock, (2) time-outs (or “tolling”), and
(3) selecting which statute applies to the case.110 For example, courts
in most states adopted a “discovery rule” under which the applicable
statute of limitations would only start running once the plaintiff did
or should have discovered the tortious act, rather than the traditional
rule, which started the statute of limitations when the tortious act
occurred.111 Some precedents of judicial flexibility and creativity in
applying statutory timing limitations and the lessons they may
provide for genetic malpractice cases are provided in Section III.A.
To address the unfair and unjust application of timing provisions in
genetic malpractice suits, several other policy fixes are possible,
which are addressed in Section III.B, below.
A. Past Precedents for Adjusting Litigation Timing Provisions to
Avoid Injustice
Timing limitations such as SoL and SoR have resulted in
unreasonable or unjust outcomes in other litigation contexts,112 and
Marchant et al. eds., 2011).
106 Id. at 83–84, 86, 88.
107 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 872.
108 See id. § 241, at 875; Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at 26–27.
109 See 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875–76; Marchant & Lindor, supra note 1, at
26–27.
110 1 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 19, § 241, at 875.
111 2 J.D. LEE & BARRY A. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION, § 25.83,
at 370–71 (rev. ed. 1994).
112 See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 540–44 (1974); Burnett v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 424–25 (1965).
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in some cases, courts or legislatures have intervened to prevent such
unfair results.113 In one such example, a litigant brought a lawsuit
in state court, but the court dismissed the case for improper venue.114
The plaintiff then properly filed the same lawsuit in the federal court,
but the district court and appellate court held that the action was
now time barred because the SoL had expired.115 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that although the SoL had technically run, the
policy behind timing limitations is outweighed “where the interests
of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s right.”116
Another context that required judicial flexibility was when a
harmed party was within a putative class in a prospective class
action, but then the class was not certified for one reason or
another.117 By the time a court decides not to certify the class, it may
be too late under the SoL for prospective class members to file
individual lawsuits. The U.S. Supreme Court held that in at least
some such circumstances the SoL for individual lawsuits by putative
class members is tolled during the pendency of the class certification
process.118
The Court stated that tolling the SoL in such
circumstances was within the power of the courts since it was
consistent with “the policies of ensuring essential fairness to
defendants and of barring a plaintiff who ‘has slept on his rights.’”119
Such a judicial modification to the application of the SoL “is in no way
inconsistent with the functional operation of a statute of
limitations.”120
Another judicial innovation to address injustices created by rigid
application of the statute of limitations is the “two disease” rule.121
For example, plaintiffs exposed to hazardous substances, such as
asbestos, face a dilemma due to the typical lag between exposure and
a diagnosis of mesothelioma.122 The initial symptom of a disease
process, however, is a condition known as asbestosis, which is usually
not life threatening, and in many cases followed by a much more
See, e.g., Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 555; Burnett, 380 U.S. at 430, 434–35.
Burnett, 380 U.S. at 424–25.
115 Id. at 425 (first citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 230 F. Supp. 767, 767–68 (S.D. Ohio
1963); and then citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 332 F.2d 529, 531 (6th Cir. 1964)).
116 Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428, 434–36.
117 See Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 542–43.
118 Id. at 560–61.
119 Id. at 554 (quoting Burnett, 380 U.S. at 428).
120 Am. Pipe & Const. Co., 414 U.S. at 554.
121 See Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175, 1177 (Pa. 2012).
122 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad:
Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C.
L. REV. 815, 820 & n.18 (2002).
113
114
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lethal mesothelioma several years or decades later.123 If an exposed
person suffering from asbestosis brings a lawsuit at the onset of
initial symptoms, she would be barred by res judicata from bringing
a second lawsuit years later if and when she developed
mesothelioma.124 But if she waited to file a lawsuit until she
developed a more serious condition, such as mesothelioma, the
defendant would argue that the statute of limitations started to run
when the plaintiff first experienced asbestosis, and thus were barred
from bringing a subsequent suit.125 Some states such as Virginia still
apply that harsh rule.126 But courts in other states used their
equitable authority to adopt a “two disease” rule, in which each
disease has its own statute of limitations, even though they result
from the same tortious act.127
In more recent years, the courts have used the term “equitable
tolling” to refer to a court’s inherent authority to toll a statute of
limitations when justice so requires.128 The Supreme Court has
generally become more strict over time in applying the equitable
tolling doctrine, now limiting its application to situations in which
the litigant establishes two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance
stood in his way and prevented timely filing.”129 In addition, the
Supreme Court has expressly held that equitable tolling applies only
to statutes of limitation and not statutes of repose.130
A similar but distinct doctrine is the “accrual suspension doctrine,”
which holds that a cause of action does not accrue when the
“defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was
unaware of their existence or it must show that its injury was
‘inherently unknowable’ at the accrual date.”131
The accrual
suspension doctrine is “well settled” in case law and “distinct from

See id. at 817 n.2, 820 n.18.
Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); Henderson & Twerski, supra
note 122, at 819–20.
125 See Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. 2000); Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 122, at 820.
126 See Kiser v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 736 S.E.2d 910, 913 (Va. 2013).
127 Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 112, 120–21 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
128 See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S.
408, 418 (2005)); Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484, 500 (1967).
129 Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016) (quoting
Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (2010)).
130 Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2017) (“[T]he Court
repeatedly has stated that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling.”).
131 Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n v. United States, 373 F.2d 356, 358–59 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (quoting Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169 (1949)).
123
124
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the question whether equitable tolling is available.”132 This doctrine
has traditionally been applied in contractual claims cases against the
United States Government involving the interpretation of the term
“accrual” in 28 U.S.C. § 2501,133 but the same equitable doctrine could
possibly be applied in other contexts, especially when the statute of
limitations used the term “accrual.”
The treatment of SLs by courts seems inconsistent––sometimes
they are applied flexibly and adjusted by equitable factors, while
other times they are applied rigidly as jurisdictional requirements
with no flexibility.134 Justice Breyer recently tried to reconcile this
disparate treatment as follows:
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect
defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. . . . Such
statutes also typically permit courts to toll the limitations
period in light of special equitable considerations.
Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much to
protect a defendant’s case-specific interest in timeliness as to
achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the
administration of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental
waiver of sovereign immunity, or promoting judicial
efficiency. The Court has often read the time limits of these
statutes as more absolute. . . . As convenient shorthand, the
Court has sometimes referred to the time limits in such
statutes as “jurisdictional.”135
Medical malpractice actions are primarily intended to protect
health care providers from stale claims and uncertainty,136 rather
than serving some governmental purpose as in the examples cited by
Justice Breyer requiring a more absolute approach,137 and thus
should be open to equitable discretion by courts to prevent unjust
results.

Martinez v. United States, 333 F.3d 1295, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012); Martinez, 333 F.3d at 1318–19; Kinsey v. United States, 852
F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic S.S. Co. v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225
(1964)).
134 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008).
135 Id. at 132–34 (internal citations omitted).
136 See Ruther v. Kaiser, 983 N.E.2d 291, 298 (Ohio 2012); cf. John R. Sand & Gravel Co.,
552 U.S. at 133 (“Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against stale
or unduly delayed claims.”).
137 See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. at 133–34.
132
133
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Another strategy for challenging unreasonable applications of
statutes of limitations or statutes of repose is to argue that such
application violates the applicable state constitution,138 which often
contain provisions assuring a citizen’s right to litigate valid legal
claims.139 For example, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held
that a statute of repose that denied a plaintiff a remedy for an injury
from a defective machine tool that occurred after the statute of repose
had run was unconstitutional (the lower court had held that the
statute of repose had started to run when the defective tool was sold
by the defendant).140 The court cited approvingly this colorful
passage from a dissenting opinion in another case:
Except in topsy-turvy land, you can’t die before you are
conceived, or be divorced before ever you marry, or harvest a
crop never planted, or burn down a house never built, or miss
a train running on a non-existent railroad. For substantially
similar reasons, it has always heretofore been accepted, as a
sort of logical “axiom,” that a statute of limitations does not
begin to run against a cause of action before that cause of
action exists, i.e., before a judicial remedy is available to a
plaintiff.141
This “logical axiom” arguably applies to all cases in which there
was no cognizable harm until after the SL expired, but not all states
have this logical axiom codified in precedent.
There have, however, been other medical malpractice cases where
the statute of repose expired before the plaintiffs had any reason to
know of the negligent act, and the court did not find the statute
unconstitutional.142 For example, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld
that state’s four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice cases
against a constitutional challenge in 2012.143 The defendant
physician and hospital in that case had allegedly failed to act on
abnormal liver enzyme tests for a patient who was diagnosed with
liver lesions and hepatitis C some ten years later.144 The Ohio
Supreme Court overturned the lower court decision that held the
See Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 291–92 (N.H. 1983).
See id. at 294.
140 Id. at 292, 296.
141 Id. at 295–96 (quoting Dincher v. Marlin Firearms Co., 198 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir.1952)
(Frank, J., dissenting)).
142 See, e.g., Ruther v. Kaiser, 983 N.E.2d 291, 300 (Ohio 2012).
143 See id. at 293.
144 Id. at 293.
138
139
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statute of repose unconstitutional because it extinguished the
plaintiff’s legal claim before such a claim was cognizant.145 The
higher court held that the legislature was within its power to
establish “a period beyond which medical claims may not be brought
even if the injury giving rise to the claim does not accrue because it
is undiscovered until after the period has ended.”146 The state
supreme court found that the legislature’s decision had a rational
basis that the courts were required to defer to:
Forcing medical providers to defend against medical claims
that occurred 10, 20, or 50 years before presents a host of
litigation concerns, including the risk that evidence is
unavailable through the death or unknown whereabouts of
witnesses, the possibility that pertinent documents were not
retained, the likelihood that evidence would be untrustworthy
due to faded memories, the potential that technology may
have changed to create a different and more stringent
standard of care not applicable to the earlier time, the risk
that the medical providers’ financial circumstances may have
changed—i.e., that practitioners have retired and no longer
carry liability insurance, the possibility that a practitioner’s
insurer has become insolvent, and the risk that the
institutional medical provider may have closed.147
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reached a similar decision in a
case involving a child who was born with a congenital condition that
later caused blindness, but which was not discovered until after her
tenth birthday.148 A lawsuit was then filed against the doctor who
had treated her as a newborn, but the supreme court held that the
claim was barred by the state’s five-year statute of repose for medical
malpractice actions.149 Recognizing the “harsh” implications of its
decision,150 the supreme court nevertheless held that “the legislature
may sever a person’s claim by a statute of limitations or a statute of
repose when the person has had no possibility of discovering the
injury-when the person has been blameless in every respect. These

145 Id. at 292, 293–94 (citing and quoting Ruther v. Kaiser, No. CA2010-07-066, 2011 WL
1346836, at *1, *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2011)).
146 Ruther, 983 N.E.2d 291 at 296, 300.
147 Id. at 296.
148 See Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 613 N.W.2d 849, 853–55 (Wis. 2000).
149 Id. at 854–55, 873.
150 Id. at 873.
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decisions represent judicial deference to the stated policy of the
legislature.”151
Thus, a constitutional challenge to a timing limitation that
prevents a plaintiff from bringing a valid case before they even had
reason to know they had a claim will succeed in some but not all
situations. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently held a
statute of repose unconstitutional in a genomic malpractice case.152
In situations where a judicial solution is not available on either
equitable or constitutional grounds, the legislature would be the last
resort for a remedy to abolish or modify an unfair statutory timing
limitation that prevents plaintiffs from bringing valid claims.153 For
example, Illinois originally had a two-year statute of limitations and
a twelve-year statute of repose for personal injury actions from
childhood sexual abuse, but in 1994, eliminated the twelve-year
statute of repose, apparently, in response to a series of discovered
childhood sexual abuse cases, which would have been time-barred by
the statute of repose notwithstanding the due diligence of the
plaintiffs.154 Another example is that in some states, such as
Mississippi and Massachusetts, the state legislature, rather than the
courts, enacted a discovery rule for starting the clock on the statute
of limitations when the plaintiff discovers the tort, rather than when
the tort occurs, in at least some tort cases.155
Perhaps the most pertinent example is the recent legislative
activity in the State of New York to pass “Lavern’s Law,” a bill that
redefines the state’s statute of limitations for medical malpractice
claims by cancer patients by extending the initiation time from when
the medical mistake is made (often involving a physician failing to
make an earlier cancer diagnosis) forward in time to when the cancer
is discovered.156 The bill was named after a cancer patient named
Lavern Wilkinson who died from cancer and was denied the right to
pursue a medical malpractice case due to the existing SoL.157 The
case attracted much attention, particularly in the Daily News, and
Id. at 864.
Yanakos v. UPMC, No. 10 WAP 2018, 2019 WL 5608534, at *11 (Pa. Oct. 31, 2019).
153 See Aicher, 613 N.W.2d at 865 (citing Tomczak v. Bailey, 578 N.W.2d 166, 170–71 (Wis.
1998)).
154 Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 66 N.E.3d 433, 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (citing Doe v. Diocese of
Dall., 917 N.E.2d 475, 484 (Ill. 2009)).
155 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4C (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (2019); 1 DOBBS ET
AL., supra note 19, § 243, at 877–78.
156 See Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/18/opinion/new-york-laverns-law-malpractice.html [https://perma
.cc/E686-ED36].
157 See id.
151
152
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resulted in reform legislation that passed both houses of the New
York legislature and was signed into law by the Governor on January
31, 2018.158 The changes to the SoL in the new bill only apply to
cancer patients,159 but this bill sets a precedent that similar changes
could be made for genetic malpractice cases.
B. Solutions for Unjust Timing Limitations in Genetic Malpractice
Cases
From the examples discussed above involving non-genomic
contexts, there are several possible approaches to avoid the unjust
application of statutes of limitation, statutes of repose, or statutory
notification requirements in genetic malpractice cases. Courts can
use their discretion and creativity by applying doctrines such as
equitable tolling to avoid unfair and unjust application of statutory
time limitations in genetic malpractice cases. In at least two cases,
the court used such discretion in a genetic malpractice case. The first
case involved a physician who failed to report a positive PKU test of
a newborn girl, who was then disabled throughout her life but was
never diagnosed with PKU.160 Decades later, she gave birth to a son
who had microcephaly, and it was then discovered that high levels of
phenylalanine in the mother’s blood due to her PKU caused the son’s
severe impairment.161 Although decades had passed since the
negligent act had occurred, the Indiana Appellate Court held that the
statute of limitations did not start to run until the mother discovered
her PKU status, and hence, the physician’s negligence, several
decades later.162 The court of appeals noted,
We are, of course, fully cognizant that we are permitting a
nearly four-decade old claim of malpractice to proceed at this
time. Nonetheless, it is not unheard of in our jurisprudence
to permit lawsuits based upon decades-old acts of negligence

158 See Heidi Evans, Hospital’s Mistake Leaves Single Brooklyn Mom with 6 Months to Live,
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 6, 2013, 2:00 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/hospitalmistake-leaves-single-mom-6-months-live-article-1.1233989
[https://perma.cc/F4WT-578C];
Michael T. Hensley & Lauren Fenton-Valdivia, New York’s Lavern’s Law Expands the
Discovery Rule Such that the Statute of Limitations Runs from the Cancer Diagnosis, BRESSLER,
AMERY & ROSS, P.C. (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.bressler.com/new-yorks-laverns-law-expandsthe-discovery-rule-such-that-the-statute-of-limitations-runs-from-the-cancer-diagnosis
[https://perma.cc/S235-VY7X]; Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, supra note 156.
159 Hensley & Fenton-Valdivia, supra note 158.
160 Houser v. Kaufman, 972 N.E.2d 927, 930–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
161 Id. at 931–32.
162 Id. at 937–38.
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to proceed, under very limited circumstances. . . . Stacy has
been forced to suffer needlessly from a debilitating, but
treatable, illness for almost forty years. Given the highly
unique facts here, and given the designated evidence of
diligence by Stacy and her parents with respect to her PKU
diagnosis (or lack thereof for the first thirty-three years of her
life), we conclude that allowing this case to proceed does not
contravene public policy and is consistent with the Act’s goals
of maintaining sufficient medical treatment and controlling
malpractice insurance costs by, in part, encouraging the
prompt presentation of claims.163
A second example is a New York case in which a couple used in
vitro fertilization (IVF) with an egg donor to give birth to twin sons.164
The IVF clinic purported to have genetically screened the egg donor,
but one of the conceived children was determined to have fragile X
syndrome many months after the child was born.165 The New York
statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action required a
lawsuit to be filed within 2.5 years of “the act, omission or failure”
that was the subject of the lawsuit.166 The defendant argued, and the
plain reading of the statute would suggest, that the act of failing to
adequately test the egg donor occurred before the IVF procedure, in
which case the statute of limitations would have expired by the time
the lawsuit was filed.167 The New York court, however, used
creativity and held that the statute started to run when the child was
born, explaining that in a “claim for wrongful birth, ‘the parents’
legally cognizable injury is the increased financial obligation’ of
raising an impaired child” and “[w]hether this legally cognizable
injury will befall potential parents as the result of the gestation of an
impaired fetus cannot be known until the pregnancy ends. Only if
there is a live birth will the injury be suffered.”168 The case was
therefore ruled to be timely and allowed to proceed, a decision that
was upheld on appeal.169

Id. at 938 (citing Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491, 496 (Ind. 1999)).
B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 22 N.Y.S.3d 190, 192 (App. Div. 2015), aff’d, 92
N.E.3d 766 (N.Y. 2017).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 193 (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2019)).
167 See B.F., 22 N.Y.S.3d at 193–94.
168 Id. at 194–95 (quoting Foote v. Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 944 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (N.Y.
2011)).
169 B.F. v. Reprod. Med. Assocs. of N.Y., 92 N.E.3d 766, 773 (N.Y. 2017).
163
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Judges and attorneys in other genetic malpractice cases in which
the statute of limitations would unfairly bar a plaintiff from bringing
a genetic malpractice lawsuit could similarly invoke their equitable
powers and creativity to extend the time for bringing the case.
Unfortunately, such a strategy will likely not work for statutes of
repose. As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, “Statutes of
repose, on the other hand, generally may not be tolled, even in cases
of extraordinary circumstances beyond a plaintiff’s control.”170
However, a recent genetic malpractice case in North Carolina
demonstrated another creative way that a court was able to
circumvent the unjust results of a statute of repose.171 In that case,
a pregnant wife engaged the defendant for prenatal care, which
included genetic testing for cystic fibrosis carrier status.172 Although
the genetic test results found the woman was a cystic fibrosis carrier,
which normally would have led to testing of the husband and then
fetus, the physician erroneously wrote in the medical record and
communicated to the couple that the wife had tested negative for
cystic fibrosis carrier status.173 The couple had a healthy child, but
several years later she got pregnant again.174 Because the wife’s
medical records showed that she did not carry a cystic fibrosis
mutation, she was not genetically tested again.175 Unfortunately, she
gave birth to a child who was subsequently diagnosed with cystic
fibrosis, over five years after the original mistake was made in
misdiagnosing the wife.176 The parents soon thereafter filed a
medical malpractice lawsuit, but the defendants argued, and the trial
court held, that the suit must be dismissed because it was barred by
the state’s four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice.177 The
Court of Appeals overturned this decision, however, by determining
that same health care facility provided care for the couple during both
pregnancies, and thus under the “continuing course of treatment”
doctrine had continued to provide care and perpetuate the original
error through the second pregnancy.178 The four-year statute of
repose therefore did not start to run until the final pre-conception

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014).
See Glover v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., No. COA 17-1398, 2018 WL 4440582,
at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 18, 2018).
172 Id. at *1.
173 Id.
174 Id. at *1–2.
175 Id. at *2.
176 See id.
177 Id. at *3.
178 Id. at *7.
170
171
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appointment in the second pregnancy so that the lawsuit was
timely.179 In reaching this decision, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals was clearly troubled by the equities of the situation:
Plaintiffs did not know, nor should they have known, of the
malpractice that had occurred—that of incorrect information
regarding Ms. Glover being a cystic fibrosis carrier—until the
birth of their son, J.G. It would be senseless to expect
Plaintiffs would presciently know of the misinformation,
before a problem arose, and would leave no recourse for
Plaintiffs. As they moved forward with family planning
decisions, such unknown abnormalities could have arisen
many years later. No matter the number of years, the
information would have been new to Plaintiffs. For the above
reasons, we find the “continuing course of treatment” doctrine
squarely applies.180
In cases where judicial discretion under the equitable tolling or
other doctrines are unavailable to prevent unjust application of
timing limitations, state constitutional arguments may provide an
alternative argument for not applying the statute of limitations,
statute of repose, or statutory notice requirement where it will
unfairly deprive a plaintiff from bringing a case to vindicate their
rights.181 As described previously, some but not all state courts have
held statutes of limitation or repose unconstitutional as applied to
limit a plaintiff’s right to bring a timely claim because the statute
had run before the plaintiff knew the cause of the injury.182 This type
of constitutional claim may be most often invoked against statutes of
repose because they are not subject to the equitable tolling or
adjustment that the courts have often applied to statutes of
limitation.
In at least one case, a court has upheld a constitutional challenge
to a statute of limitations that had run before the plaintiffs would
have had time to realize they had a viable genetic malpractice
claim.183 In that case, a couple who had already had one child with
Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy got pregnant again and sought

Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
181 See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 296 (N.H. 1983).
182 See, e.g., id.; Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 (Tex. 1984); Susan C. Randall,
Comment, Due Process Challenges to Statutes of Repose, 40 SW. L.J. 997, 1001 n.18 (1986).
183 Nelson, 678 S.W.2d at 923.
179
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genetic testing to determine whether the mother was a carrier.184
The genetics expert they consulted conducted genetic testing of the
mother and reported that she did not carry the condition.185 Three
years after the second child was born, he was diagnosed with
Duchenne’s muscular dystrophy.186 The parents filed a medical
malpractice lawsuit, but it was dismissed on the grounds that the
two-year statute of limitations had started to run at the time of the
negligent genetic advice and had, therefore, expired.187 The Texas
Supreme Court reversed this decision, holding that applying the twoyear statute of limitations to prevent the parents from bringing a suit
after they first learned of the mistake after the correct genetic
diagnosis of their child violated the open courts provision of the state
constitution “by cutting off a cause of action before the party knows,
or reasonably should know, that he is injured.”188 The state supreme
court described such an unfair outcome as “shocking” and “absurd.”189
If neither an equitable or constitutional court challenge to an
unjust SoL or SoR is available, the final option is legislative relief.190
It may be difficult to persuade state legislators to take up this issue
when only a handful cases have presented problems to date.
However, if genomic malpractice cases become more prevalent, and
more plaintiffs are unfairly denied an opportunity to pursue their
claims on the merits due to the unique timing issues in many genetic
malpractice cases, it is possible that a legislative remedy could
eventually be feasible.191 A high-profile case that stirs public outrage
at the unfairness and injustice of the outcome, as has recently
occurred in New York with Lavern’s Law,192 would likely be
necessary to get sufficient political traction and support. At a
minimum, given that statutes of repose only exist in some but not all
states in the medical context, legislatures should be wary of adopting
new statutes of repose that would apply to genomic malpractice
cases.

Id. at 919–20.
Id. at 920.
186 Id.
187 Id. at 919.
188 Id. at 919, 922–23.
189 Id. at 923 (quoting Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412, 414 (Tex. 1972); Gaddis v. Smith, 417
S.W.2d 577, 681 (Tex. 1967)).
190 See, e.g., Editorial, Reset the Clock for Malpractice Suits, supra note 156.
191 See supra notes 154–155 and accompanying text.
192 See supra notes 156–158 and accompanying text.
184
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CONCLUSION
Genetic malpractice cases present unique timing issues because
they often involve negligent acts that do not result in manifested
clinical outcomes until several years or even a generation or two
later. As a result, the fair resolution of such cases will often be in
tension with statutory timing limits such as statutes of limitations
and statutes of repose. There have already been several cases where
plaintiffs allegedly harmed by a provider’s negligent act relating to
genetic information were denied an opportunity to prosecute their
case because they did not discover the tort until after the timing limit
had expired. Judges and attorneys should be aware that there may
be judicial tools available to counter unfair and unjust applications
of statutory timing limits. In particular, the courts can use equitable
tolling or other equitable patterns to ensure fair application of the
statute of limitations by providing the plaintiff a reasonable
opportunity and time to file a lawsuit after the time in which they did
or reasonably should have discovered the existence of their legal
claim. Statutes of repose present a greater challenge, since they are
generally not subject to equitable modifications, and therefore a
constitutional challenge is the most promising approach. If a judicial
solution is not available, then legislative modifications of the
statutory timing limitation may be the only recourse for plaintiffs
denied a fair opportunity to litigate their genetic malpractice claim.

